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Reforming Common Sense Legal Reforms
CARL TOBIAS"

The Contract With America figured prominently in the Republican
Party's victories in the 1994 congressional races. During the opening
days of the 104th Congress, therefore, approximately one hundred sponsors introduced the Common Sense Legal Refonns Act (CSLRA),
which embodied several measures that comprised the Contract's ninth
precept. 1 The only constituent of this package of proposals which
actually became law was the Private Securities Litigation Refonn Act
(PSLRA).2 Both Houses of Congress did pass products liability refonn
bills but lacked the requisite votes to override President Bill Clinton's
veto.3 The House of Representatives approved the Attorney Accountability Act (AAA), which would have modified the substantial 1993
amendment in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 governing sanctions;
Federal Rule 68 covering offers of judgment; and an evidentiary requirement that the Supreme Court interpreted in 1993.4
The Republican Party eaptured additional seats in the Senate and
retained a slight majority in the House of Representatives in the 1996
elections; however, the Grand Old Party has insufficient votes to override vetoes which might be exercised by President Clinton, who won
re-election. It was, thus, unclear that Republicans would reintroduce a
products liability bill or the AAA, or would offer other substantive or
procedural reform measures. Although the leaders of both political
parties made conciliatory overtures immediately after the 1996 elections,

* Professor of Law, University of Montana. I wish to thank Peggy Sanner and Hanle
Waters for valuable suggestions; Cecelia Palmer and Charlotte Wllmuton for processing this
piece; as well as Ann and Tom Boone and tire Harris Trust for generous, continuing support.
Errors that remain are mine.
I. See H.R. 10, 104th Cong. (1995).
2._ See Private Securities Litigation Refonn Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat 737
(1995) (to be codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) [hereinafter PSLRA].
3. See H.R. 956, 104th Cong. (l995); S. 565, 104th Cong. (1995); see also John E. Yang.
House Fails to Override Liability Veto, WASH. POST, May 10, 1996, at A23.
4. See H.R. 988, 104th Cong. (1995); see also FED. R. av. P. l l(c); FED. R. av. P. 68;
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Phanns., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
537

538

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30:537

Republican members introduced several important legal reform proposals at the outset of the 1OS th Congress. These measures would individually and synergistically have important impacts on considerable federal
civil litigation and the civil justice system. For example, the proposals'
sponsors apparently introduced the measures with minimal understanding of how they could affect several significant, continuing public and
private reform efforts, most notably the Civil Justice Reform Act
(CJRA) of 1990 which is scheduled to sunset in 1997.
The reforms' passage, therefore, might have numerous adverse impacts, such as further fragmenting the already fractured character of
federal civil procedure. Some of the proposals' strictures could even
have effects opposite froni those which sponsors intended and those
expressly prescribed in the CJRA by, for instance, increasing cost and
delay in civil litigation. The new measures, thus, may be symptomatic
of much that is presently wrong with the civil justice process and
might exacerbate certain problems. Notwithstanding several of the
complications enumerated, Congress's composition apparently affords
opportunities for bipartisan cooperation which could lead to the adoption of legal reforms. The above factors mean that the recently introduced proposals deserve analysis. This Article undertakes that effort.
This Article's first section describes the background of the new
legal reforms, emphasizing those ongoing public and private initiatives
with which important aspects of the recent measures may conflict. The
second section descriptively evaluates the substantive and procedural
provisions of the PSLRA and the latest proposals and examines the
detrimental impacts which these strictures may have on continuing reform efforts, particular cases, and the civil justice system.
This section determines· that numerous requirements in the measures
alone and together could adversely affect plaintiffs and parties with
limited resources or power, such as civil rights litigants by, for example, restricting their access to federal court. The proposals individually
and in combination might also have deleterious impacts on the civil
justice process. They may conflict with ongoing reform endeavors, and
increase complexity and disuniformity in federal civil procedure, which
will correspondingly impose greater expense and delay.
The third section, accordingly, offers recommendations for the future, which principally involve attempts to resolve problems that the
recent measures present. These suggestions primarily call upon Congress to reject the AAA and the products liability proposal or delay
passage of their prescriptions which would have the disadvantageous
effects delineated above while rescinding, or discontinuing implementa-
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tion of, the PSLRA's provisions that are having those impacts. If
Congress believes that the two new refonns' effectuation will not have,
and that the PSLRA has not had, detrimental effects on continuing
initiatives, considerable civil litigation, or the civil justice system, or if
it decides to proceed for different reasons, Congress must at least evaluate other possibilities. For instance, Congress should attempt to harmonize the proposals' requirements with ongoing refonn efforts, namely
the CJRA which may expire soon.
I.

THE ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF LEGAL REFORMS

Those legal refonns that constitute the backdrop against which the
sponsors of the recent measures drafted and introduced the proposed
legislation require relatively thorough examination in this essay, even
though their origins and development have been rather comprehensively
evaluated elsewhere.5 Comparatively extensive treatment is warranted
because most of the earlier refonns have lengthy, complicated histories,
and these enhance comprehension of the recent proposals, especially by
showing how legislators who introduced them apparently did so with
minimal appreciation of the prior efforts. This section mainly explores
procedural refonns, by initially examining the processes for promulgating and amending federal civil procedures and implicating federal civil
justice refonn, and secondarily considers substantive reforms, by evaluating initiatives relating to products liability law.
A. Procedural Reforms
1. Processes for Promulgating and Amending Federal Procedures

Congress adopted the Rules Enabling Act of 1934, which empowered the Supreme Court to promulgate rules of practice for civil litigation in the federal district courts, after years of controversial discussion.6 The Court named the original Advisory Committee on the Civil
Rules (Advisory Committee) that consisted of fourteen practicing attor-

5. See, e.g., Linda S. Mullenix, Hope O-.·er F.xperience: Mandatory lnfonnal Dlsca..-ery and
the Politics of Rulemaking, 69 N.C. L. REv. 795 (1991); Carl Tobias, Improving the 1988 and
1990 Judicial Improvements Act, 46 STAN. L. REv. 1589 (1994).
6. See Rules Enabling Act, Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stnt. 1064 (1934) (current version nt
28 U.S.C. §§ 2071-2077 (1994)). See generally Stephen B. Bwbank, The Rules Enabling Act
of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1015 (1982); Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure In Historical Perspecth'e, 135 U. PA. L. REv.
909 (1987).
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neys and law faculty during 1935.7 This group concluded its draft of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1937. The Court subscribed to
the requirements essentially as tendered, and the strictures took effect
during 1938. 8 The Committee intended to draft procedures which
would be simple, uniform, and trans-substantive and which would promote prompt, economical, and merit-based resolution of civil disputes. 9
The Federal Rules required that all federal district courts employ the
same procedures; 10 however, Rule 83 authorized each district to prescribe local procedures, which could erode the uniform, simple procedural scheme which the drafters envisioned. 11
The Federal Rules appeared to function effectively for the initial
three decades after their adoption, 12 but several developments fostered
increasing dissatisfaction with the procedures by the mid-1970s. Numerous judges and practitioners and a few commentators asserted that
the federal courts were encountering a litigation explosion in which
lawyers and litigants were pursuing substantial numbers of suits, too
many of which lacked merit. 13 Certain judges and attorneys were troubled by abuse of the civil justice system and suggested that courts
sanction those who perpetrated abuse, while critics claimed that the
uniform, simple procedural regime embodied in the Rules encouraged
these problems. 14 A number of observers also expressed concern about

7. See, e.g., Subrin, supra note ·6, at 970-73; Carl Tobias, Public Law Litigation arid the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 14 CORNELL L. REv. 270, 272-73 (1989).
8. See, e.g., Subrin, supra note 6, at 970-93; Tobias, supra note 7, at 273.
9. See, e.g., Robert M. Cover, For James Wm. Moore: Some Reflections on a Reading of
the Rules, 84 YALE LJ. 718 (1975); Judith Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure In
Decline, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 494, 502-15 (1986); Stephen N. Subrin, The New Era In American Civil Procedure, 61 A.BA. J. 1648, 1649-51 (1981).
10. See, e.g., Subrin, supra note 9, at 1650; Tobias, supra note 7, at 274-75.
11. See FED. R. av. P. 83 (authorizing districts to adopt local rules that are not inconsistent with the Federal Rules). That restriction has been honored in the breach. See 1985
amendment of FED. R. av. P. 83, advisory committee's note.
12. See Symposium, The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 58 COLUM. L. REv. 435 (1958).
See generally Resnik, supra note 9, at 516; Tobias, supra note 7, at 277-78.
13. See, e.g., Warren E. Burger, Agenda for 2000 A.D.-A Need for Systematic Anticipation,
in THE POUND CONFERENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE IN TIIE FUTURE 23 (A. Leo Levin &
Russell Wheeler eds., 1979); Francis R. Kirkham, Complex Civil Litigation-Have Good Intentions Gone Awry?, in THE POUND CONFERENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE IN THE FtmJRE,
supra, at 211-12; see also Tobias, supra note 7, at 287-89 (reviewing debate over litigation explosion).
14. See, e.g., Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 740-41 (1975); Order
Amending the Federal Rules of Civil. Procedure, 446 U.S. 997, 1000 (1980) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Arthur R. Miller, The Adversary System: Dinosaur or Phoenix, 69 MINN. L. REV. 1
(1984).
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complications attributable to the proliferation of local procedures. is
Some of these strictures, an overwhelming majority of which federal
districts have adopted since 1975, conflicted with the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, requirements in the United States Code, or local provisions in additional federal districts.
The Judicial Conference of the United States, which is the federal
courts' policymaking arm, invoked several responses to these concerns.
The Conference orchestrated promulgation of the 1983 revisions to
Federal Rules 7, 11, 16, and 26, which were meant to be an integrated
package that would expand lawyers' duties as officers of the court and
increase judicial control over civil litigation, especially in the pretrial
process. 16 Rules 16 and 26 respectively enhanced courts' power during
pretrial conferences and discovery. 17 The revisions authorized judges to
impose sanctions for the Rules' violations, while Rule 11 commanded
judges to sanction those who did not perform reasonable prefiling inquiries or who filed inadequate papers. 18
The Judicial Conference responded in two ways to the complications presented by local procedural proliferation. The Conference sponsored Rule 83's revision that permitted districts to adopt or revise local
rules, only after affording public notice and opportunity for comment,
and prescribed individual judges' standing orders which contravened the
Federal Rules or local rules. 19 The Conference also established the
Local Rules Project which collected and evaluated 5000 local rules,
many of which conflicted with the Federal Rules, and numerous additional local requirements that governed practice in the districts.20
A number of judges, lawyers, and writers evinced mounting dissatisfaction with the national rule revision process, and congressional ac-

15. See, e.g., ND. CAL R. 235-7, reprinted in Robert F. Peckham, The Federal Judge as a
Case Manager: The New Role in Guiding a Case from Filing to Disposition, 69 CAL. L. REv.
770, 776-77 & n30 (1981).
See generally Carl Tobias. Chlil Justice &form and the
Balkanization of Federal Civil Procedure, 24 ARIZ. ST. LI. 1393 (1992).
16. See Order Amending Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 461 U.S. 1097 (1983) [hereinafter 1983 Order); Subrin, supra note 9, at 1650. See generally ARTHUR. R. l\1Ju.ER, THE 1983
AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CML PROCEDURE: PRO~!OTlNG EfFEcnVE CAsE
MANAGEMENT AND LAWYER REsPONSIBILl1Y (1984).
17. See 1983 Order, 461 U.S. at 1097.
18. See id.
19. See FED. R. C!v. P. 83.
20. See COMMITIEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, JUD!ClAL Co~CE OF
THE U.S., REPORT OF THE LocAL RULES PROJECT: LocAL RULES o:-: 0V1L PROCEDURE 1
(1989); see also Daniel R. Coquillette et al., The Role of Lccal Ruler, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1989, at
62 (providing summary of Local Rules Project).
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tivity probably reflected this concem. 21 During 1973, Congress intervened in that process by passing legislation which replaced the Federal
Rules of Evidence that the Supreme Court had promulgated, thus vitiating much work of Judicial Conference committees.22 During 1974,
Congress postponed for one year the date on which revised Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure were to become effective.23 In the 1980s,
Congress altered the Court's amendment of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4.24
Five decades after the initial Federal Rules of Civil Procedure took
effect, Congress enacted the Judicial Improvements Act (JIA) of 1988.
The JIA was meant to modernize and open the national and local procedural amendment processes.25 The legislation was intended to improve federal rule revision and to revitalize, and restore the primacy of,
the national rule amendment process by opening it to enhanced public
participation, essentially assimilating the procedures to notice-comment
rulemaking under the Administrative Procedure Act. 26 Congress concomitantly attempted to reduce local procedural proliferation by imposing requirements on the promulgation and modification of local procedures which were analogous to those for Federal Rule revision. 27 The
legislation also required that every circuit judicial council periodically
review for consistency a!I. local procedures and abrogate or change
those considered to conflict.28

21. See Jack B. Weinstein, Reform of Federal Court Rulemaking Procedures, 16 COLUM. L.
REV. 905 (1976); see also WINIFRED R. BROWN, JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF nm U.S., FEDERAL
RULEMAKING: PROBLEMS AND POSSIBILITIES (1981); Tobias, supra note 5, at 1598.
22. See H.R. REP. No. 100-889, at 27-29 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5982,
5987-89; see also Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat 1926 (1974). In 1993, an Advisory Committee
on Federal Rules of Evidence was. reactivated. See 150 F.R.D. 330 {1994); see also 141
F.R.D. 282 (1993).
23. See Pub. L. No. 93-361, 88 Stat 397 (1974); Howard Lesnick, The Federal Rule-Making Process: A Time for Re-examination, 61 A.B.A. J. 579 (1975). Congress has since fre·
quently intervened to "delay the effective date of, disapprove, or modify rules and amendments." H.R. REP. No. 100-889, at 27, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5982, 5987.
24. See Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Amendments Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-462, 96
Stat 2527 {1983) (codified as l!lllended at 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (1994)); see also Paul D.
Carrington, Continuing Work on the Civil Rules: The Summons, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 733
(1988) {analyzing prospects for Rule 4 reform).
25. See Tobias, supra note 5, at 1599; see also 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071(b), 2073 (1994); H.R.
REP. No. 100-889, at 27, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5982, 5987. See generally Mullenix,
supra note 5, at 830-32.
26. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (1994); see also 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071(b), 2073 (1994).
27. See 28 U.S.C. § 2071 notes (1994). Districts were to appoint advisory committees and
to apply public notice and comment procedures.
28. See id. § 332{d){4); see also id. § 2071(c)(1).
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The initial test of the JIA's changes in the national rule revision
process led to adoption of the 1993 Federal Rules revisions.29 I emphasize Rule 11 's 1983 amendment because it became the most controversial modification in the Federal Rules' history and because one of
the recent reform proposals would substantially change the 1993 amendment; essentially reinstituting the 1983 version.30 Rule 11 's 1983 revision proved controversial when many lawyers seized on confusion regarding the amendment's primary purpose and invoked the Rule to seek
recovery of attorneys' fees, while numerous judges granted those requests and made attorney-fee shifting the preferred sanction.JI The
pursuit of compensation encouraged much costly, unnecessary satellite
litigation unrelated to the merits of lawsuits,J2 as did the revision's
ambiguous wording and inconsistent judicial construction.J 3 Lawyers
also used Rule 11 for tactical purposes, such as threatening less powerful parties in ways that were meant to discourage their avid pursuit of
litigation.34 These considerations disadvantaged, and even chilled the
enthusiasm of, resource-poor litigants, such as civil rights plaintiffs.JS
The 1983 revision apparently offered certain advantages, such as deterring the filing of frivolous cases.J 6
The national rule revisors, especially the Advisory Committee,
which had primary responsibility for developing proposals for changes
in the Rules, seemed to effectuate faithfully and efficaciously the JIA's

29. See Supreme Court of the United States, Amendments to the Federal Rules of C"IVil
Procedure and Fonns, reprinted in 146 F.R.D. 401 (1993) [hereinafter 1993 Amendments].
30.. Rule 26's 1993 revision to impose automatic disclosure was important See Infra notes
49-53. Rule 4 was also substantially changed. See supra note 24 nnd nccompanying text
31. See ELIZABETH WIGGINS ET AL., FEDERAL JUDICIAL CTR., RuLE 11: FINAL RfroRT TO
ADVISORY COMMITIEE ON CML Rm.Es OF lHE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF lHE UNITED STATES
§ IB, at 9 (1991) (stating that attorneys' fees were snnction of choice); Melissa L Nclkcn.
Sanctions Under Amended Federal Rule I I-Some "Chilling" Problems In the Struggle Between
Compensation and Punishment, 14 GEO. LI. 1313 (1986) (discussing confusion).
32. See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, 77:e Transformation of American Ch:ll Procedure: 11:e
F.xample of Rule ll, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1925, 1927-28 (1989); Carl Tobias, Rule Jl and
Civil Rights Litigation, 37 BUFF. L. REv. 485, 514 (1988-89).
33. See, e.g., Burbank, supra note 32, at 1930-31; Carl Tobias, Cil'll Righu Plaintiffs and
the Proposed Revision of Rule Jl, 77 IOWA L. REv. 1775, 1776 (1992).
34. See, e.g., Carl Tobias, Reconsidering Rule Jl, 46 U. MIAMI L REv. SSS, 876-77
(1992); see also Nelken, supra note 31, at 1327, 1340.
35. See, e.g., Nelken. supra note 31, at 1327 (suggesting that Rule 11 is invoked, nnd sanctions levied, against these plaintiffs more often than any class of civil litigant); Tobias, supra
note 32, at 503-06; Georgene M. Vairo, Rule ll: A Critical Analysis, 118 F.RD. 189, 200-01
(1988).
36. See, e.g., Arthur R. Miller, 77:e New Cert!ficatlon Standard Under Rule Jl, 130 F.RD.
479 (1990); William W Schwaner, Rule ll Revis/led, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1013 (1988).
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strictures relating to the revision process. The Committee was responsive to public criticism of its draft proposals and apparently made good
faith efforts to improve them. 37 The Advisory Committee wrote numerous drafts, conscientiously consulted public input, and attempted to
develop the fairest, clearest change conceivable.38 Indeed, the Committee's efforts constitute the type of open, responsive amendment process
and rational decisionmaking which Congress contemplated when modifying the rule revision process in the 1988 Act.39 Notwithstanding the
Committee's laudable efforts, many individuals and groups continued to
criticize the 1993 revision. 4° For instance, Supreme Court Justice
Antonin Scalia, who dissented from the Supreme Court's transmittal of
the amended Rule, claimed that it would "eliminate a significant and
necessary deterrent to frivolous litigation.•'4t
The 1993 amendment significantly improved the 1983 revision.
The 1993 modification has reduced incentives to invoke Rule 11 improperly and concomitantly decreased cost and delay attributable to
satellite litigation. For example, the 1993 version has a safe harbor for
parties that purportedly contravene the Rule, entrusts sanctioning for
violations of the provision to judicial discretion, and severely circumscribes those situations in which judges can levy the sanction of
attorney's fees. 42 The 1993 revision was a balanced, efficacious compromise, given the pragmatic restraints on rule revision, such as the
need to satisfy. constituencies as diverse as the federal bench and
plaintiffs' and defense attorneys. 43

37. It even inverted the nonnal rule revision sequence for Rule 11 by requesting public
comment before drafting a proposal. See Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the
Judicial Conf. of the U.S., Call for Written Comments on Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure and Related Rules, 131 F.R.D. 344, 345 (1990).
38. See Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conf. of the U.S.,
Proposed Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 146 F.R.D. 419, 460 (July 1992)
[hereinafter 1992 Proposed Amendments]; see also Tobias, supra note 34, at 859-65; Carl
Tobias, The 1993 Revision of Federal Rule 11, 70 IND. LJ. 171 (1994) [hereinafter Tobias,
1993 Revision].
39. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text See generally Laurens Walker, A Comprehensive Reform for Federal Civil Rulemaking, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 455 (1993).
40. See Tobias, 1993 Revision, supra note 38, at 186-88.
41. 1993 Amendments, supra note 29, at 507-10 (dissenting statement).
42. See FED. R. C1v. P. ll(c), reprinted in 146 F.R.D. at 421-23; see also Tobias, supra

note 33, at 1783-88. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the amendment has had its intended
effects. See Laura Duncan, Sanctions Litigation Declining, A.B.A. J., Mar. 1995, at 12.
43. Since 1990, the Committee has been drafting a major revision of Rule 23 governing
class actions and recently issued a draft. See Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure
of the Judicial Conf. of the U.S., Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendment to Federal Rule of
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The strictures respecting local rule revision in the 1988 JIA have
received rather limited implementation.44 Practically all of the ninetyfour districts have appointed local advisory committees. Numerous
courts have formalized processes for adopting and revising local procedures and have opened them to public involvement, while some districts
have prescribed new, or amended existing, local procedures pursuant to
the processes. A few courts have implemented the JIA's mandates relating to local procedural proliferation.45 For example, a tiny number of
districts have attempted to restrict local procedures, and virtually none
have abrogated or changed ,conflicting local requirements. The Seventh
and Ninth Circuit Judicial Councils may be the only ones which have
abolished or modified local district procedures. Several factors probably
explain this implementation. Perhaps most significant, civil justice reform initiatives, primarily instituted by Congress in the 1990 CJRA,
essentially suspended the efforts of local rules committees and circuit
judicial councils which might have treated local proliferation.
2. Federal Civil Justice Reform
Congress passed the CJRA of 1990 out of increasing concern about
expense and delay in civil litigation.46 The measure mandated that each
district prescribe a civil justice expense and delay reduction plan, which
might include eleven statutorily provided procedures, primarily governing judicial case management, discovery and alternatives to dispute
resolution (ADR), and additional techniques which could save cost or
time.47 The CJRA implicitly encouraged districts to apply measures
which conflict with the F~eral Rules, provisions in the United States
Code, and strictures in other courts.48 Numerous districts adopted varyCivil Procedure 23, reprinted in 167 F.R.D. 523, 535 (1996). See generally Symposium. 77re
Institute of Judicial Administration Research Conference on Class Actions, 71 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1
(1996).
44. I rely substantially in this paragraph on Tobias, supra note S, at 1604-06, nnd Qui
Tobias, Suggestions for Circuit Court Review of Local Procedures, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REv.
359 (1995).
45. See Tobias, supra note 5, at ·1604-06.
46. See id.; 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-482 (1994).
47. See 28 U.S.C. § 473 (1994). Districts adopted plans by December 1993 nnd then experimented. See id. § 471 notes. The CJRA also created new entities, circuit review committees, to monitor district implementation and assigned the Judicial Conrcrcnce similar duties.
See id. § 474; see also Tobias, supra note 15, at 1406-11.
48. See 28 U.S.C. § 473 (1994); see also Id. § 2071 (requiring local rules to be "consistent
with Acts of Congress" and Federal Rules). See generally Pnul D. Carrington. A New Confederacy? Disunionism in the Federal Courts, 45 DUKE LJ. 929 (1996); Lauren K. Robel, Fractured Procedure: The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 46 STAN. L. REv. 1447 (1994).
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ing combinations of the prescribed procedures, and some courts applied
additional measures pursuant to the twelfth open-ended provision. For
example, quite a few districts relied on the enumerated prescriptions,
particularly those governing discovery, to adopt inconsistent local procedures which implemented automatic disclosure, a novel and controversial discovery mechanism.49
Experimentation with disclosure became especially troubling because
the national rule revisors were simultaneously proposing an amendment
to Federal Rule 26 which would have imposed disclosure nationwide.50
The revision entities eventually prescribed a Federal Rule amendment
which was meant to accommodate CJRA experimentation by allowing
all ninety-four districts to alter the provision or to reject it. 51 Because
Congress did not change the revision transmitted and many districts had
apparently failed to plan for other contingencies, much confusion
arose. 52 Districts adopted numerous variations of disclosure, and some
courts eschewed it; these developments have increased inconsistency,
expense, and delay. 53
.
The Eastern District of Texas most boldly and expressly asserted its
authority to promulgate conflicting local procedures by proclaiming that,
insofar as the "Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are inconsistent with
[the Court's] Plan, the Plan has precedence and is controlling."54 The
district adopted and held valid against challenge a settlement offer provision which conflicted with Rule 68.55
The problems that arose when all ninety-four districts adopted a
broad array of disparate procedures were exacerbated because many
judges have inconsistently interpreted the provisions, and some did not

49. See, e.g., U.S. DIST. & BANKR. COURT FOR 11IB DIST. OF IDAHO, CIVIL JUSTICE Ex·
PENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN 10-11 (Dec. 19, 1991); U.S. DIST. COURT FOR 11IB E.
DIST. OF N.Y., CIVIL JUSTICE ExPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN 4-S (Dec. 17, 1991).
SO. See Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conf. of the U.S.,
Proposed Amendments of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, reprinted in 137 F.RD. S3, 87·88
(1991) [hereinafter 1991 Proposed Amendments]; see also Tobias, supra note S, at 1611.
SI. See 1993 Amendments, supra note 29, at 431; see also Tobias, supra note S, at 1612.
S2. See Tobias, supra note S, at 1612-14.
S3. See id. at 1614-IS.
S4. U.S. DIST. COURT FOR 11IB E. DIST. OF TEX., CIVIL JUSTICE ExPENSE AND DELAY
REDUCTION PLAN 9 (Dec. 20, 1991).
SS. See id. at 8; see also Friends of the Earth v. Chevron Chem. Co., 88S F. Supp. 934
(E.D. Tex. 199S) (upholding validity of Civil Justice Expense and Delay Plan procedure adopt·
ed under the CJRA, despite the fact that it differs from the Federal Rules). But see Ashland
Chem. Inc. v. Barco Inc., 123 F.3d 261 (Sth Cir. 1997) (invalidating local attorney fee-shifting
rule adopted under the CJRA because CJRA did not authorize it). See generally Carrington,
supra note 48.
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apply certain measures which their courts had prescribed.56 Lawyers
and litigants have also encountered problems finding, comprehending,
and complying with the relevant local requirements.57 These developments, particularly the increasingly complicated and disuniform nature
of federal civil procedure, have apparently increased cost and delay in
civil litigation. This has been true for most attorneys and parties, but
it has especially disadvantaged those with few resources or those that
litigate in multiple districts.58 The developments also show how the
1990 CJRA.'s implementation essentially suspended effectuation of those
aspects of the .1988 JIA which were meant to treat local procedural
proliferation.59 For example, circuit judicial councils might have been
reluctant to scrutinize, much less abrogate, conflicting local strictures
which the 1990 statute seemed to authorize.60 Indeed, the Si>.'th Circuit
Council suspended its review of local rules pending the receipt of
greater guidance from Congress, the Judicial Conference, or case law
on whether the CJRA superseded the Federal Rules. 61
B. Substantive Reforms
1. Products Liability

The fifty states have traditionally articulated and changed substantive products liability law. State supreme courts have assumed major
responsibility for enunciating and altering products liability doctrine,
primarily through case law and common law development.62 The 1965

See Tobias, supra note 5, at 1621.
See id.; Tobias, supra note 15, at 1422-25.
See Tobias, supra note 15, at 1422-25; see also Tobias, supra note 32, n1 495-98.
See supra notes 27-28, 44-45 and accompanying text.
60. The CJRA also created analogous entities, circuit review committees, and nssigned them
similar oversight responsibilities. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
61. See United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, Minutes of the Meeting of the
Judicial Council 4-5 (May 4, 1994); see also Carl Tobias, A Sixlh Circuit Story, 23 FLA. ST.
U. L. REv. 983 (1996) [hereinafter Tobias, Sixlh]. The Bush Administration experimented "ith
civil justice reform in the executive branch. See Exec. Order No. 12,778, 3 C.F.R. 359
(1991), reprinted in 28 U.S.C. § 519 (1994). See generally Carl Tobias, F.xecutil"e Branch
Civil Justice Refonn, 42 AM. U. L REv. 1521 (1993). President Clinton essentially subscnocd
to this effort. See Exec. Order No. 12,988, reprbited bi 61 Fed. Reg. 4,729 (1996). Executive Branch civil justice reform is less relevant to the issues that 1 analyze in this essay.
Many ideas above regarding federal procedural revision processes and civil justice reform may
be relevant to analogous processes and reforms in many states; however, they have less 11pplicability to the issues treated in this essay. See Carl Tobias, Common Sense and Other Legal
Refonns, 48 VAND. L. REv. 699, 717 (1995) [hereinafter Tobias, Common Sense].
62. See WILLIAM PROSSER & w. PAGE KEEToN, PROSSER AND KEEToN ON THE LAW OF
TORTS 677-724 (5th ed. 1984).
56.
57.
58.
59.
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adoption of the Restatement of Torts Second section 402A by the
American Law Institute (ALI) greatly affected products liability law,
and its formulation of the strict liability basis literally swept the country. 63 Nearly all of the states have adopted some variation of the Restatement articulation; however, a few follow the common law enunciation of strict liability which the California Supreme Court adopted in
Greenman v. Yuba Power Products. 64 Many state legislatures have
passed statutes which alter certain features of the case law doctrine of
strict products liability or which codify some aspects of the Restatement
formulation. 65
The strict liability base of products liability has been rather controversial. Numerous courts and some commentators have apparently
found the strict manner in which liability has been imposed for products defects too inflexible. 66 Manufacturers and other defendants have
claimed that strict liability unfairly exposes them to excessive liability,
substantially elevates the cost of insurance, and complicates efforts to
design, manufacture, advertise, and sell products. 67
The ALI recently approyed a Restatement Third of Torts governing
products liability. 68 The drafts produced by the project's reporters,
working with a group of advisors, proved to be somewhat controversial
for several reasons. 69 Numerous observers claimed that the Restatement's proposed language limited too greatly the strict liability base
and could even return products liability law to negligence in certain

63. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965); PROSSER & KEETON, supra note
62, at 694 (asserting section 402A swept the country); Oscar S. Gray, The Draft ALI Products
Liability Proposals: Progress or Anachronism?, 61 TENN. L. REV. 1105, 1109 (1994) (swnc).
64. 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963). The State of Alaska follows Greenman. See, e.g., Shanks
v. Upjohn, 835 P.2d 1189, 1194 {Alaska 1992).
65. See, e:g., MT. CODE ANN. §§ 27-1-719 to -720 (1979); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:58C-1
to C-5 (West 1989). See generally WILLIAM L. PROSSER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIAlS ON
TORTS 808 {9th ed. 1994).
66. See, e.g., Prentis v. Yale Mfg. Co., 365 N.W .2d 176 (Mich. 1984) (applying a pure
negligence, risk-utilify test in products liability action when liability is predicated on defective
design); Grundberg v. Upjohn, 813 P.2d 89 (Utah 1991) (holding manufacturer of FDA-ap·
proved drugs immune from strict liability claims based on design defects due to the inherent
dangerousness of prescription drugs); James A. Henderson & Aaron D. Twerski, Doctrinal Col·
lapse in Products Liability: The Empty Shell of Failure lo Warn, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 265, 27173 (1990).
67. See, e.g., PETER HUBER, LIABILITY: nm LEGAL REVOLUJ10N AND ITS CONSEQUENCES
(1988); W. KIP VISCUS!, REFORMING PRODUCTS LIABILITY 37-41 (1991).
68. See REsTATEMENT {TulRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY (Proposed Official Draft,
1~~
.
69. See, e.g., REsTATEMENT {TulRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY (Draft No. I, 1993);
REsTATEMENT {THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY (Tentative Draft No. I, 1993).
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respects.70 Additional critics asserted that some phrasing of the provision and aspects of its attendant commentary did not restate the law,
which they contend prescribes strict liability.71 After several relatively
contentious floor debates, the ALI membership agreed to adopt the
reporters' work product.72
2. Fee Shifting

Fee shifting can be described as substantive or procedural. However, it warrants terse treatment here because no pure fee-shifting provision appeared in the final versions of any legal reforms that the 104th
Congress considered.73 The American Rule which, absent statute or
contract, prohibits the losing litigant from paying the winning party's
attorney's fees, has traditionally governed fee shifting.74 Congress has
generally left fee shifting to the states, but it has passed some 200
statutes which prescribe fee shifting.75 Most of these measures provide
for fee shifting to encourage the pursuit of litigation which vindicates
significant social policies. For example, Congress has inserted fee-shifting provisions in civil rights legislation to promote suit by individuals
and groups who have suffered discrimination and to deter those who
may discriminate from doing so. Congress has also prescribed fee
shifting in environmental statutes to facilitate environmental cleanup or

70. See, e.g., Gray, supra note 63, at 1113; Marshall S. Shapo, In Search of /he Law of
Products Liability: The AU Restatement Project, 48 VAND. L. REv. 631, 695-96 (1995).
71. See, e.g., Howard Klemme, Comments to /he Reporters and Selected Members of /he
Consultative Group, Restatement of Torts (Third): Products Liability, 61 TENN. L. REv. 1173
(1994); Laity S. Stewart, The American Law Institute and Products Liability: "Restatement or
Reform"?, TRIAL, Sept 1994, at 29-30.
72. See ALI Wraps Up Product Liability Project, 65 U.S.L.W. 2777 (1997); AU Hesitates
On ltrnyer Liability, Products Liability Restatement Efforts, 62 U.S.L.W. 2734, 2735-36 (1994).
Efforts to pass federal products liability legislation before 1995 deserve limited tremment as
they are less relevant to the issues treated in this Article. See, e.g., Products Liability Fairness
Act, S. 687, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); see also Tobias, Common Serue, supra note 61, at
718 n.98.
73. See Tobias, Common Sense, supra note 61, at 726, 729-31; see also H.R. 988, 104th
Cong. § 2 (1995) (proposing limited fee shifting under Rule 68); in.fra note 85 and accompanying text (creating presumption of fee-shifting for Rule 11 violations in securities litigation).
74. See, e.g., Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 257 (1975);
Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1973); see also John Leubsdort: Toward a History of the American Rule on Attorney Fee Recavery, 47 LAW & CoNm.lP. PROBS. 9, IS (Winter 1984).
75. See Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 43 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also John F.
Vargo, The American Rule on Attorney Fee Allocation: The Injured Person's Acce.s.s to Justice,
42 AM. U. L. REv. 1567, 1588 (1993).
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to prevent pollution.76
Concerns, including the litigation explosion, litigation abuse, manufacturers' exposure to liability in products liability cases mentioned
above, 77 and basic fairness and increased litigation costs seem to underlie proposals which would require losing parties to pay their opponents'
legal fees. A valuable example is the CSLRA's fee-shifting provision
which would have empowered judges to award prevailing litigants in
diversity cases reasonable attorneys' fees and to exercise judicial discretion not to assess fees or to reduce their amount when special conditions made awards unfair. 78

II.

CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF

THE NEW LEGAL REFORM PROPOSALS

This section selectively analyzes the strictures included in the recent
legal reforms. I descriptively evaluate the provisions, attempt to provide the reasons for the requirements' inclusion, and critically assess
the strictures, especially in terms of their possible impacts on continuing reforms. I first analyze the Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act, the only aspect of the Common Sense Legal Reforms Act which
became law, because this statute illustrates the effects that the new
measures may have. I then consider the recent proposals.
A. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995
The securities litigation reform legislation is intended to change
securities lawsuits in numerous important ways. 79 The statute's features
which are most relevant to the issues examined in this essay are the
imposition of special pleading, sanctions, and class action requirements.
Congress meant for the modifications to restrict the amount of abusive
securities litigation, particul?flY lawsuits which are lawyer-driven or are
brought to extract settlements.

76. See, e.g., Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b)
(1994); Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2618(d) (1994); see also Tobias, supra note
7, at 313-17; Vargo, supra note 75, at 1587-89.
77. See supra notes 13-14, 16-18, 67 and accompanying text
78. See H.R. 10, 104th Cong. § 101 (1995).
79. See PSLRA, supra note 2. See generally Willard T. Carleton et al., Securities Class
Action Lawsuits: A Descriptive Study, 38 ARIZ. L. REv. 491 (1996); John C. Coffee, Jr., The
Future of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act: Or, Why the Fat Lady Has Not Yet
Sung, 51 Bus. LAw.- 975 (1996); Joel Seligman, The Private Securities Reform Act of 1995, 38
ARiz. L. REv. 717 (1996).
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The PSLRA requires that plaintiffs satisfy heightened pleading stan. dards in cases pursued under the 1933 and 1934 securities Jaws.8° For
example, a plaintiff must "specifically plead with particularity each
statement alleged to have been misleading," setting forth in detail the
reason why the statement is misleading, while a plaintiff, when making
an allegation premised on information and belief, "must state with particularity all facts in [its] possession on which the belief is formed." 81
Specialized pleading conflicts with the general notice pleading system
of the FederaJ Rules, which the Supreme Court recently reaffirmed, and
erodes the Rules' trans-substantive nature.82 Imposing more burdensome pleading has apparently discouraged plaintiffs from bringing fraud
claims and undermined the securities statutes' purposes.
The PSLRA also stays all discovery pending the resolution of motions to dismiss or for summary judgment to prevent the imposition of
unnecessary discovery costs on defendants. 83 This stricture, in conjunction with particularized pleading, creates a "catch-22" for plaintiffs
analogous to the one which arose under Rule 11 's 1983 revision: 84 the
PSLRA demands that plaintiffs plead with specificity, yet suspends
discovery, thereby denying access to the very information that plaintiffs
may need to so plead, much less to prove their cases. Moreover, sec-

80. See PSLRA, supra note 2, § 101; see also IS U.S.C. §§ 77, 78 (1994); H. CO~'F. REP.
No. 104-369, at 41 (199S), reprinted in 199S U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 740. See generally Elliott J.
Weiss, The New Securities Fraud Pleading Requirement: Speed Bump or Road Block?, 38
ARiz. L. REv. 67S (1996).
81. H. CONF. REP. No. 104-369, at 41 (199S), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.c.A.N. 730, 740;
see also Marksman Partners v. Chantal Phann. Corp., 927 F. Supp. 1297 (CD. Cnl. 1996)
(finding heightened standards satisfied). See generally Paul M. Tyrrell & George L. de Verges,
A Chilling Effect: 17ze Impact of the Motion lo Dismiss Under the Prh"ate Securities Litigation
Reform Act of 1995, 173 F.R.D. SS6 (1997).
82. See Leathennan v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, S07 U.S.
163 (1993); see also Carl Tobias, 17ze Transformation of Trans..Substantfrlty, 49 WASH. & LE£
L. REv. 1501 (1992) (discussing trans-substantivity); Tobias, supra note 7, at 296-301 {discussing notice pleading regime). Federal Ruic 9(b) docs require that plaintiffs plead allegations of
fraud with particularity, an idea that the PSLRA's sponsors pwportcdly intended to capture.
See H. CONF. REP. No. 104-369, at 41 (199S), reprinted in 199S U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 740.
83. See PSLRA, supra note 2, § 101; see also H. CO?'.'F. REP. No. 104-369, at 32 (1995),
reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.CAN. 730, 731; Medhekar v. United States DisL CL for the ND.
Cal., 99 F3d 325 (9th Cir. 1996) (interpreting discovery provision to include automatic disclosure). See_ generally John F. Olson et al., Pleading Reform, Plaintiff Qualljicatlon and Discovery Stays Under the Reform Act, Si Bus. LAW. 1101, 113S-42 (1996); Tyncll & de Verges,
supra note 81, at 558.
84. See, e.g., Johnson v. United Slates, 788 F.2d 845, 856 (2d Cir. 1986) (Pratt, J., dissenting); Rodgers v. Lincoln Towing Serv., 771 F.2d 194 (7th Cir. 1985). See generally Tobias,
supra note 32, at 493-9S.
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tion 101 modifies the sanctioning provision of Federal Rule 11 in several ways to deter abusive securities cases. Most importantly, the
PSLRA provides that the "court shall include in the record specific
findings regarding compliance by each party and each attorney [with]
each requirement of Rule ll(b) . . . as to any complaint, responsive
pleading, or dispositive motion," while the statute creates a presumption
that prevailing parties will recover "all attorney's fees and costs incurred in the entire action" when litigation is found to be abusive. 85
Section 101 of the PSLRA includes other requirements which are
intended to prevent allegedly abusive practices that have been associated with securities class action litigation. 86 For instance, certain of the
legislation's strictures are meant to "encourage the most capable representatives of the plaintiff class to participate in class action litigation
and to exercise supervision .and control of the lawyers for the class."87
These provisions for class actions and sanctions may impose several
disadvantages which are analogous to those produced by particularized
pleading. The strictures could dissuade many potential plaintiffs and
their counsel from pursuing actions and undermine the securities legislation's objectives, while the mandates further erode the Federal Rules'
trans-substantive character. The possibly corrosive impacts on national
rule revision seem equally important. Legislating special requirements
for class actions may disrupt or at least undercut the half-decade effort
of the national revision entities and their expert advisors to analyze Rule
23 closely, to conscientiously draft modifications in the class action
mechanism, and to circulate and seek public input on several drafts. 88
The partial amendment of Rule 11 so soon after the revisors meticulously changed the provision in 1993 could also discourage them. 89

85. H. CONF. REP. No. 104-369, at 39 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 738;
see also PSLRA, supra note 2, § 101. The mandatory Rule 11 review will consume scarce
resources of judges, lawyers, and litigants. See generally Olson et al., supra note 83, at 1132·
34; Richard M. Phillips et al., The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995:
Rebalancing Litigation Risks And Rewards for Class Action Plaintiffs, ·Defendants and La»}'ers,
SI Bus. LAW. 1009, 1045-48 (1996).
86. See PSLRA, supra no~ 2, § 101; see also H. CoNF. REP. No. 104-369, at 41 (1995),
reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 740. See generally Phillips et al., supra note 85, at
I 039-41, I 048-50.
87. H. CoNF. REP. No. 104-369, at 39 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 738;
see also PSLRA, supra note 2, § 101; In re Cephalon Sec. Litig., No. CIV.A. 96-CV-0633,
1996 WL 515203, at *I (E.D. Pa Aug. 27, 1996) (permitting appointment of multiple lead
plaintiffs).
88. See supra note 43.
89. See supra notes 30-43 and accompanying text
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The imposition of numerous new strictures on securities litigation
has apparently limited access to federal courts in additional ways which
resemble those assessed earlier. As with civil justice reform, attorneys
and clients must learn about, comprehend, and satisfy the requirements
prescribed which will consume scarce time and resources.90 Similar to
the 1983 revision of Federal Rule 11, the institution of new commands
will probably encourage considerable unnecessary, costly satellite litigation implicating the mandates' meaning and application.91 Some anecdotal information indicates that plaintiffs have initiated fewer federal
securities class actions and may have pursued less vigorously those
cases filed. 92
B. Attorney Accountability Act of 1995
1. Rule 11 Modification

The AAA would have altered Rule 11 's 1993 revision by making the
imposition of sanctions mandatory, not discretionary, thus reinstituting the
1983 formulation, and by specifically stating that the sanctions awarded
would be sufficient to "compensate the parties that were injured" as well
as adequate to deter.93 A few justifications seem to underlie the modifications which the AAA would institute.94 First, the changes should deter
lawyers and litigants who~ a number of judges, attorneys, and parties
believe might be tempted to violate Rule 11. Second, the alterations
would apparently offer sufficient incentives for those harmed by Rule
violations to invoke the provision. The modifications concomitantly reinforce the foregoing concepts by removing judicial discretion not to levy
sanctions generally or for compensatory reasons.

90. See supra notes 57-58 and aCcompanying texl
91. See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying tcxl See SECURITIES & ExCH. CO~t'.t'N, REPORT TO 1liE PRESIDENT AND 1liE CoNGRESS ON 1liE FIRST YEAR OF PRACTICE Uh'DER 1liE
PRIVATE SECURITIES LmGAllON REFORM ACT OF 1995 (1997) [hereinafter SEC REPoR.T).
92. See Inteiview with Mark Gitenstein, Attorney with Mayer, Bro\\n & Platt, in Washington, D.C. (Jan. 2, 1997); see also SEC REPORT, supra note 91; Hope Viner Sambom, Fear of
Filing, A.B.A. J., May 1997, at 28. But see Study Indicates No Decline in Federal Securities
Class Suits, Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) (Nov. 27, 1996).
93. H.R. 988, 104th Cong. § 1 (1995); see also 1983 amendment of FED. R. Ctv. P. 11, reprinted in 97 F.R.D. 195, 197 (1983) (making mandatory judicial imposition of sanctions).
94. I rely substantially in this paragraph on the dissenting statement to 1993 Amendments, supra
note 29, at 507-10 (dissenting statement); Hearing on H.R. JO Before the Subcomm. on Courts
and Intellectual Properly of the House Comm. on the Judiciary (testimony of Debra Ballen, Senior
Vice President, American Insurance Ass'n) (Feb. 6, 1995); see al.so Duncan, supra note 42, at
12.
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Several problems accompany the proposals that sanctioning be mandatory and that judges award sanctions to reimburse injured parties.
The provision would revive the most troubling aspects of the 1983
revision of Rule 11 and the precise features which the national rule
revisors meant the 1993 amendment to eliminate or ameliorate. These
include the incentives to use Rule 11 for compensatory and strategic
reasons, which can foster unwarranted, costly satellite litigation and
which can have chilling effects on some litigants, namely resource-poor
parties. 95 The two alterations may reinstitute the 1983 version's other
disadvantages, such as the Rule's threat and retreat dimension, the provision's tendency to try attorneys not cases, and the increased incivility
that it seemed to provoke. 96 Those problems would adversely affect
litigants, counsel, and judges in specific lawsuits and the civil justice
system.
Congressional enactment of these changes in Rule 11 might have
even more deleterious impacts on the national rule revision process. 97
Rule 11 's 1993 modification evolved from an effort in which the revisors clearly denominated a complication, carefully assessed it, drafted
proposed alterations, solicited and examined much public comment, and
prodigiously wrote drafts that they thought were responsive to public
input and constituted the fairest, clearest provision which could be assembled. The amendment ultimately adopted represented the finest
effort of the revision committees and their expert advisors to address
equitably and fully all of the interests that the changes would implicate
The procedures foland to fashion an effective compromise.
lowed-inviting public scrutiny, thoroughly evaluating public input, and
drafting proposed modifications in light of those recommendations-embodied the kind of open, rational decisionmaking process that
Congress contemplated when passing the 1988 JIA.
Legislative change of two important, carefully-considered dimensions of the revisors' concerted efforts to improve Rule 11 so recently
after the provision's substantial amendment and before it has even had
an opportunity to operate would be unwarranted and detrimental. Congressional reversal would directly undercut one of the JIA's central

95. See supra notes 31-36 and accompanying text
96. See INTERIM REPORT OF THE CoMM. ON QVJUTY OF THE SEVENTH FED. JUDICIAL CIR•
CUIT 20-21 (Apr. 1991) (asserting idea regarding Rule 11 and civility); Tobias, supra note 33,

at 1785 (asserting all three propositions).
97. In this paragraph, I rely substantially on supra notes 30-43 and accompanying text.
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purposes, making the national rule revision process paramount again.98
Essential, peremptory legislative modification of such a controversial
provision following so quickly upon gargantuan endeavors to reformulate it could eviscerate national rule amendment, additionally crippling
those procedures at a time of substantial susceptibility and demoralizing
many participants in the 1993 revision effort99
Enactment of this section of the AAA would also continue inadvisable, disruptive congressional intervention in the rule amendment process.100 In 1995, the American Bar Association (ABA) House of Delegates actually promulgated a resolution urging Congress to reject the
suggested changes in Rule 11 because modifications of Federal Rules
"should be left to the existing rulemaking bodies." 101 Passage of the
AAA's Rule 11 alterations could concomitantly extend the unwise practice of too frequent procedural policymaking by Congress that adoption
of the 1988 IlA and 1990 CJRA typifies. 102

2. Rule 68 Modification
Another section of the AAA would have amended Rule 68 by permitting courts to require parties that reject offers of judgment but recover less than those offers at trial to pay the reasonable attorneys' fees
of their opponents in diversity cases, although judges would have discretion not to levy such fees or to decrease the amount when special
circumstances make awards unjust. 103 "Reasonable attorney's fees" are
the "actual cost incurred by the nonprevailing party for .an attorney's
fee payable to an attorney in connection with [the] claim" or a "reasonable cost that would have been· incurred," had the party not signed a
contingency fee agreement. 104 Fairness is one justification for this pro-

98. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text
99. Some observers think that the revisors' inclusion of a local oplion provision in the disclosure revision severely eroded their credibility and national uniformity and simplicity. See,
e.g., Lauren K. Robel, Mandatory Disclosure and Local .Abrogation: In Search of a Theory for
Optional Rules, 14 REv. LmG. 49 (1994); Carl Tobias, Collision Course in Federal Civil Discovery, 145 F.R.D. 139 (1993); see also supra notes 50-57 and accompanying text
100. See supra notes 22-24, 88-89 and accompanying text
101. Brad Bole, Congress Again Takes Up "Legal &fenn", LmG. NEWS, Fcb.-Ma.r. 1995, at
l, 6; interview with Brad Bole, Echevarria Law Firm, in Tampa, FL (Feb. 27, 1995).
102. See Tobias, supra note S, at 1599-1604; supra notes 25-28, 46-61 and accompanying
text
103. See H.R. 988, 104th Cong. § 2 (1995). Similnr proposals were introduced in the fust
session of the 105th Congress, but none were passed. See H.R. 903, 105th Cong., 1st Scss.
(1997); H.R. 2603, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. (1997).
104. H.R. 988, 104th Cong. § 2 (1995).
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posal because it enables defendants to seek recovery of attorneys' fees
:from plaintiffs who receive smaller awards at trial than they were offered in settlement. A second is that the prospect of having to pay
adversaries' attorneys' fees will encourage settlements and save resources of litigants and the court system.
The foremost criticism of the modification is that it contravenes the
premises, primarily involving access to courts, which underpin the longstanding American Rule. Indeed, the ABA's sustained support for open
court access and opposition to "across the board 'loser pays' without
regard to subject matter'' led the Association to admonish that Congress
reject this provision of the AAA. 105 The fee-shifting measure could
restrict access by fostering much unwarranted, costly satellite litigation.
For example, questions about how injunctive relief, which plaintiffs
:frequently secure in public law litigation, compares with monetary offers of judgment under Rule 68 and what reasonable attorneys' fees are
under many statutory schemes have engendered considerable satellite
litigation, some of which have even been resolved by the Supreme
Court. 106 This provision might limit access in cases which are close,
complex, difficult or costly to prove, or in which possible plaintiffs
have little power or money because the exposure to liability for opponents' attorneys' fees will chill potential litigants' enthusiasm for filing
or vigorously pursuing litigation. Parties that may function as private
attorneys-general in enforcing products safety, consumer or natural
resources protection statutes or policies may be particularly vulnerable
to the impacts reviewed in this paragraph. 107

105. Bole, supra note 101, at 6.
106. See, e.g., Texas State Teachers Ass'n v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist, 488 U.S. 815
(1989); City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561 (1986); see also Tobias, supra note 7, at
310-16.
107. Plaintiffs operate as private attorneys-general by, for example, pursuing cases over pollution which the Environmental Protection Agency regulates with insufficient rigor. See Tobias,
supra note 7, at 314-17. See generally Bryant Garth et al., The Institution of the Private Attorney General: Perspectives .from an Empirical Study of Class Action Litigation, 61 S. CAL. L.
REY. 353 (1988). This proposal arguably interferes with state prerogatives. Insofar as feeshifting is a matter of state substantive law, it would federalize an area which traditionally (and
perhaps for constitutional reasons) has been left to the states. The Supreme Court has stated
that attorney fees are a matter of state substantive law. See Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., SOI
U.S. 32 (1991); see also Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827 (1990).
A similar proposal was introduced in the first session of the I OSth Congress, but it did not
pass. See H.R. 903, IOSth Cong., 1st Sess. (1997).
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3. Modification of Federal Rule of Evidence 702
The AAA's third section would have revised Federal Rule of Evidence
702 by limiting expert testimony, ostensibly to increase "honesty in testimony."108 The provision would make admissible a witness's opinion
which was premised on scientific knowledge only if the court concludes
that it is (1) based on scientifically valid reasoning, and (2) sufficiently
reliable so that the probative value of such evidence outweighs the dangers specified in Rule 403. 109
These strictures could frustrate the efforts of plaintiffs in complicated products liability, environmental cases, and other fonns of litigation
which require testimony on complex scientific questions to locate experts who can testify and to prove their cases. The revision might also
complicate the efforts of plaintiffs in these lawsuits to operate as private attorneys-general 110 and to vindicate significant purposes of some
environmental legislation. The Supreme Court recently considered
issues implicating expert testimony that so closely involve those which
this provision affects that it could simply be an effort to overrule the
Court's decision. 111
Most importantly, a legislative change of Federal Rule of Evidence
702, as with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, would conflict with a
continuing refonn effort. The recommended modifications in Rule 702
appear appropriate for examination in the ordinary course of the rule
amendment process. In the 1990s, the national revision entities entertained the possibility of revising Rule 702, but failed to institute the
alterations that the AAA would effect 112 Congressional amendment of
an evidentiary provision would seriously compromise the principal purpose in recently assembling an Advisory Committee on Rules of Evidence113 and could even hann this entity's credibility before the committee could prove its value. 114 In fact, when the ABA opposed legis-

108. H.R. 988, 104th Cong. § 3 (1995).
109. See id.
110. See supra note 107 and accompanying text
111. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
112. See 1991 Proposed Amendments, supra note SO, 137 F.R.D. at 156 (proposing amendment); see also _Supreme Court of the U.S., Amendments to Federal Rules of Evidence. Excerpt
from the Report .of the Judicial Conf. Comm. on Rules of Practice ll!ld Procedure, reprillted in
147 F.R.D. 275, 282 (1993) (stating that the proposed amendment of Ruic 702 was referred to
the new Advisory Committee). See generally Jack B. Weinstein, Rule 702 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence is Sound; It Should Not Be Amended, 138 F.R.D. 631 (1991).
113. See supra note 22.
114. See supra note 112.
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lative revision of Rule 702, the organization stressed that alteration of
the "Federal Rules of Evidence should be left to the existing
rulemaking bodies." 115
C. Products Liability Reform
The products liability reform measures which the 104th Congress
considered would have significantly changed substantive products liability law, while the major proposal that the 1OS th Congress is examining
will do so. Most important to this Article are restrictions on seller liability for harm which is ascribed to defective products in numerous
circumstances 116 and requirements that plaintiffs only recover punitive
damages when they prove by clear and convincing evidence that defendants acted with "conscious, flagrant indifference to the rights of safety
of others" and that such damages generally be capped. 117 The major
rationale for limiting seller liability is that plaintiffs sue sellers in a
large percentage of products lawsuits, but sellers are ultimately held
liable in few cases. 118 The principal reason for restricting punitive
damage awards is that allowing juries to assess the damages, especially
pursuant to ambiguous or overly lenient criteria, can expose defendants
to enormous liability.
One problem with reducing sellers' liability is that it could eliminate any local defendants and the only parties that might eventually be
found liable for plaintiffs' harm. 119 The difficulty with limiting punitive damages is the loss of punishment and deterrence that can result in
situations when defendants deserve such treatment. These and additional aspects of the products iiability measure could restrict federal court
access and impose other disadvantages, such as reducing the number of
lawsuits in which plaintiffs act as private attorneys-general. 120 Insofar

115. Bole, supra note 101, at 6.
116. See H.R. 956, 104th Cong. § 103(8) (1995). A similar proposal was introduced in the
first session of the 105th Congress, but it did not pass. See S. 648, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. §
103 (1996).
117. H.R. 956, 104th Cong. § 108 (1995); see S. 648, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. § 108 (1996).
Congress deleted from the final version of H.R. 956 provisions, such as a special Rule 11 for
products cases, which were more "procedural" in nature. See Tobias, Common Sense, supra
note 61, at 732-33; see also H.R. 956, 104th Cong. § 107 (1995) {prescribing special ADR
procedures); S. 648, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. § 107 (1996) (same).
118. See PROSSER ET AL., supra note 65, at 795 n.4.
119. The limitation on joint liability for noneconomic damages could exacerbate this situation.
See H.R. 956, 104th Cong. § 110 (1995); see S. 648, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. § 110 (1996).
120. See supra notes 107, 110 and accompanying text
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as the proposal's provisions would modify products liability substantive
law, they could also interfere with the ALI's recently-completed section
402A of the Restatement Third. 121
ill.

SUGGESTIONS FOR THE

FUIURE

A number of ideas which I explored above suggest that Congress
must eschew or delay passage of the AAA and the products liability
reform measure while reconsidering, and perhaps modifying, the
PSLRA. · During the first session of the 105th Congress, Congress
should have scrutinized CJRA experimentation, clearly prescribed the
statute's expiration, and facilitated the JIA's revitalization and comprehensive implementation. Although the first session of Congress did not
institute these actions, the second session should.
A. Rejecting, Postponing, or Modifying Legal Reforms
1. Effects on Continuing Reforms

Passage of the AAA and the products liability proposal would, as
the PSLRA's adoption did, complicate, disrupt, or threaten several continuing reform efforts. The CJRA's enactment, a mere two years after
the JIA's passage, exemplifies both the need to be cautious and the
dangers of legislating without accounting for prior reform initiatives.
Congress adopted the 1988 JIA because the federal bench and Congress
recognized that local procedural proliferation was complicating civil
practice and undercutting the national rule revision process which had
served the nation well for .a half-century. However, Congress passed
the 1990 CJRA, essentially suspending those features of the JIA which
Congress intended to address proliferation and restore the primacy of
the national amendment process, before they could even be effectuated.
The AAA's enactment could, like the PSLRA's passage, have similar
impacts on those aspects of the JIA that Congress meant to revitalize
the national revision process.

121. See supra notes 68-72 and accompanying tc.xL The proposal's advocates favor the
prompt unifonnity and certainty which passage would afford, even though the measure would
cover only a small percentage of situations. The proponents may also be concerned that state
courts and legislatures will not adopt the Restatement Third, although advocates should favor
the Restatement's broader applicability, particularly its treatment of critical issues, such as design defect and duty to warn. Finally, to the extent that the measure treats substantive products liability law and punitive damages awards, which have traditionally been matters of state
law, it may interfere with the prerogatives of state supreme courts and legislatures.

560

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30:537

When Congress passed the 1995 PSLRA, it legislated before Rule
11 's significant 1993 revision was thoroughly implemented, without
reflecting on the expert evaluations of CJRA experimentation which
Congress commissioned or assessing the reports and recommendations it
requested that the Judicial Conference prepare. 122 Congressional adoption of the AAA before May 1997 would have had similar effects.
The PSLRA's imposition of special Rule 11 sanctions and Rule 23
class action requirements in securities litigation did, and the AAA's
enactment would, constitute direct legislative amendment of the Federal
Rules while bypassing the carefully-crafted national revision procedures.
Thus, like the PSLRA, the AAA would frustrate Congress' own efforts
in the 1988 JIA to restore the primacy of that process. If Congress
adopted the products liability reform bill today, the measure could adversely affect the ALI's new Restatement Third covering products liability.123
2. Effects on the Civil Justice System and on Specific Cases
The adoption of new and often conflicting procedural strictures and
the interference with ongoing reform initiatives will impose greater
complexity, cost, and delay on the civil justice process and in civil
lawsuits. Judges must master, construe, and enforce the requirements,
while counsel and litigants· will have to find, comprehend, and satisfy
them. Indeed, CJRA experimentation in all ninety-four districts with its
diverse measures for reducing expense and delay and the large number
of 1993 Federal Rules revisions, some of which authorized local variations from the Federal amendments, have apparently exceeded the patience of judges, attorneys, and parties for procedural modification.
The PSLRA's enactment, and the AAA's adoption, seem likely to exacerbate procedural overload. Many of the substantive and procedural
commands in the PSLRA," the AAA, and the products liability bill
individually, but especially together, could also have adverse impacts on
particular civil suits. For example, the AAA's proposed changes in
Federal Rules 11 and 68 would probably limit federal court access for
those lawyers and litigants whose dearth of power and resources makes
them risk averse, as the PSLRA's mandates may have.

122.
tional
Final
Conf.
123.

See 28 U.S.C. § 471 notes {1994). The Conference considered but did not initiate narule revision for CJRA procedures that were efficacious. See Judicial Conf. of the U.S.,
Report on the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, at 2, 18 {1997) (hereinafter Judicial
Report]; see also id.; see infra note 126.
See supra notes 68-72, 121 and accompanying text
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In short, the imposition of new strictures and the interference with
continuing reforms, which can be attributed to the PSLRA and which
could result from the AAA and the products liability measure, may
well have effects that are diametrically opposed to those which Congress intended in passing the JIA and the CJRA. They may further
erode the primacy of the national revision process that the JIA was
meant to restore, while increasing the cost and delay the CJRA was
supposed to reduce. 124
B. Rejecting, Postponing, or Modifying Legal Reforms Thal Conflict
With Ongoing Initiatives
Congress may find that the PSLRA does not, and that the AAA
and the products liability reform proposal would not, have deleterious
effects on continuing initiatives, individual suits, or the civil justice system; or that other reasons warrant against proceeding. If Congress so
finds, it must seriously explore additional options. Congress at least
should rescind or discontinue implementing the PSLRA's provisions
which do conflict and reject, or postpone adopting those features of the
AAA and the products liability measure that will interfere with ongoing
reforms until the initiatives have ended, their efficacy has been evaluated, and decisions regarding the efforts' future have been made.
By the end of 1997, all of the federal district courts had essentially
finished the most far-reaching experimentation with mechanisms for
decreasing cost and delay ever undertaken, while the RAND Corporation, the FJC, and the ninety-four districts had systematically assembled,
assessed, and synthesized an unprecedented quantity of empirical material regarding the experimentation's efficacy. During January 1997, the
RAND Corporation issued its report on experimentation in the ten pilot
courts, and the FJC released its study of the five demonstration districts.125 By May, the Judicial Conference had submitted to Congress

124. The Chair of the ABA Litigation Section summarized much above in descnoing similar
measures considered by the 104th Congress as a "sort of hodgepodge nttempt to nddrcss perceived problems with the legal systept. Quick and dirty solutions shouldn't he imposed where
a more thoughtful approach is clearly called for." Bole, supra note 101, nt 6.
125. See JAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL., JUST, SPEEDY AND INEXPENSIVE? AN EvALUATlON OF
JUDICIAL CAsE MANAGEMENT UNDER nm CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM Acr (1996); Do~
STIENSTRA ET AL., REPoRT TO nm JUDICIAL CONFERENCE CO~t>.UTIEE ON COURT ADMINISTRATION AND CASE MANAGEMENT, A STUDY OF nm FIVE DEMONSTRATION PROGRAMS EsTABUSHED
UNDER nm CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM Acr OF 1990 (FJC 1997); see also 28
§ 471 notes

u.s.c.

(1994) (prescribing experimentation and evaluation).
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its reports and recommendations on the two programs. 126 In 1997, the
remaining seventy-nine districts effectively completed experimentation
and were able to afford a sense of many measures' efficacy. Once this
experimentation has been rigorously evaluated and Congress has scrutinized the Conference reports and suggestions, it can make better-considered determinations respecting specific strictures included in the
PSLRA, the AAA, and the products liability proposal, as well as the
effectiveness of numerous procedures for decreasing expense and delay.
Moreover, the future of national rule revision and of the civil justice
system should be considered. 127
C. Experimentation
Congress could also investigate the possibility of authorizing future
experimentation. Congress must keep in mind that every state has instituted, or is experimenting with, a plethora of reforms, 128 while many
federal districts have applied numerous experimental mechanisms, the
efficacy of which Congress will soon be evaluating. Moreover, nascent
experience with the PSLRA's strictures, such as the special Rule 11
and Rule 23 requirements, suggest they have limited the filing and avid
pursuit of securities litigation.
Should Congress find these endeavors insufficient, it could provide
for additional efforts. For example, Congress might prescribe experimentation with the AAA's offer of judgment provision in a few federal
courts for a set time, even though this approach may disadvantage
certain parties in those districts or encourage forum shopping. 129 The
project could be premised on prior programs, such as experimentation

126. See Judicial Conf. Report, supra note 122. Congress asked the Conference to suggest
whether measures receiving pilot court experimentation should apply more broadly. If the Con·
ference had so suggested, it was to initiate rule revision. However, the Conference rejected
expansion. It therefore had to "identify alternative, more effective cost and delay reduction
programs," and it might use rule revision to implement its decision. CJRA, § 10S(c)(2)(c); see
also Judicial Conf. Report, supra, at 2-4, 18; 28 U.S.C. § 471 notes (1994). The Conference
only had to report on the demonstration program results. See id.; see also supra note 122;
infra note 137 and accompanying text
127. Congress should remember that a lack of empirical data probably led to the two most
controversial Federal Rules revisions-Rule ll's 1983 change and Rule 26's 1993 modification
imposing automatic disclosure. See, e.g., Burbank, supra note 32, at 192S-27; Walker, supra
note 39, at 4S6-S9; see also supra notes 30-3S, SO-S3 and accompanying text
128. See supra note 61.
129. One district conducted CJRA experimentation with a similar measure, and Congress
should consult this experience. See supra note SS and accompanying text
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with court-annexed arbitratjon or with CJRA procedures. 13 Congress
might also facilitate wider experimentation by prescribing a 1991 proposed amendment in Federal Rule 83 that the national rule revisors
withdrew. 131
D. Reasons for Suggestions
Several reasons, which are sufficiently important to warrant recapitulation here, suggest Congress not adopt strictures in the AAA or the
products liability proposal which will adversely affect ongoing reform
initiatives, specific cases, or the civil justice system. They also suggest
Congress abrogate the PSLRA's requirements which do so. The provisions may sacrifice advantages that could be gleaned from the reforms
while imposing more complications, expense, and delay in civil suits
and on the civil justice process. For example, the AAA's amendment
of Federal Rule 11 in ways that would reinstitute phenomena such as
costly, · unwarranted satellite litigation and chilling the enthusiasm of
civil rights plaintiffs, which the national revision entities considered so
problematic and meticulously sought to eliminate from the Rule only
four years ago, would undercut the 1993 amendment before it was
completely implemented and evaluated. 132 Adoption of this modification and that proposed for Rule 68 would circumvent the national revision procedures and would further and unnecessarily erode this process
at a time when its longstanding authority and respect have been seri-

130. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 651-658 (1994); see also Pub. L No. 105-S3, § 1, lll Slllt. 1173
(1997). See generally BARBARA S. MEIERHOEFER, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER. COURT-AN·
NEXED ARBITRATION IN TEN DISTRICT COURTS (1990). The work must be coordinated with
the CJRA's conclusion. For example, CJRA measures that had promise but were not effective
enough to warrant national application may deserve future cxperimentnlion.
131. Districts with Judicial Conference !!pproval could have c.'(Jlerimented for five years with
inconsistent procedures. See 1991 Proposed Amendments, supra note SD, 137 F.R.D. at 1S3.
See generally Tobias, supra note S, at 1616, 1633. Congressional intervention in rule revision
is generally unwise. However, legislative revision of Ruic 83 may be appropriate because issues
of authority are implicated. See A. Leo Levin, Local Rules as Experiments: A Study in tk
Division of Power, 139 U. PA. L REY. 1S67, 1585-87 (1991); see also Crurington, supra note
48, at 1006; see also infra notes 142-44 and accompanying tc.xt (ano.lyzing proposal's benefils).
132. See supra notes 30-43, 93-102 and accompanying text. The PSLRA's imposition of a
special Rule 11 may have already had similar, but narrower, effects. See supra notes SS, 89
and accompanying text The PSLRA's imposition of special class action strictures could complicate the ongoing effort to amend Ruic 23. See supra notes 43, 86-88 and accompanying
text
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ously compromised. 133 The passage of a federal products liability statute might correspondingly undermine the ALI's attempts to improve the
Restatement of Torts and conflict with state efforts which are directed
at products liability. 134
E. A Postscript on the PSLRA
I analyzed above numerous reasons why the PSLRA's passage was
ill-advised; however, certain of those ideas deserve emphasis here because they inform understanding of the disadvantages that could result
from the reforms which the 1OS th Congress is presently considering.
Perhaps most significant, the PSLRA has eroded ongoing efforts to
restore the primacy of the national amendment process by altering aspects of nine Federal Rules. Indeed, the national revision entities have
intensively scrutinized several of these provisions, namely Rules 11 and
23, in the ordinary course of rule amendment and approved, or proposed, their extensive modification. The partial legislative revisions in
numerous Federal Rules that the PSLRA effects, thus, might have undermined attempts to revitalize the national amendment process by
avoiding it and by authorizing strictures which differ from existing
Federal Rules.
Many onerous substantive and procedural requirements that the
PSLRA imposes have complicated efforts of plaintiffs to plead and
prove securities fraud, partly by restricting their access to relevant information. The need to find, understand, and comply with the new
strictures, particularly procedures which depart from the Federal Rules,
has also increased expense and delay in maintaining securities fraud
actions. The above phenomena have apparently discouraged the institution and vigorous pursuit of those cases and have frustrated realization
of the securities laws' purposes. These factors can dissuade potential
plaintiffs from enforcing the statutes and acting as private attomeysgeneral to vindicate the public interest in reducing securities fraud by
punishing or deterring its perpetrators. 135
Congress, therefore, might want to reconsider, and even modify, the
PSLRA. However, numerous members of that body may resist revisiting a statute so soon after enactment when it could be difficult to as-

133. See supra notes 99-101 and accompanying text; see also infra Part 111.E (suggesting
PSLRA has similarly bypassed and possibly eroded process).
134. See supra notes 62-72, 121 and accompanying text
135. See supra notes 107, 110 and accompanying text
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certain with sufficient certainty the precise effects of the legislation's
implementation. If Congress finds reevaluation and possible amendment
premature today, it must authorize an expert entity, such as the FJC,
the Administrative Office of the United States Courts (AO), or the
RAND Corporation to undertake a careful study of the PSLRA's impacts. Once relevant empirical data have been systematically assembled, analyzed, and synthesized, Congress should decide whether legislative change is warranted. 136

F. A Postscript on the 199.0 CJRA. and the 1988 JIA
I am not advocating that the 1OS th Congress ignore the concerns
which prompted its members to reintroduce the AAA and the products
liability reform measure and the 104th Congress to pass the PSLRA.
On the contrary, the lOOth and lOlst Congresses prescribed a blueprint
for the future that is responsive to certain of the questions implicated.
Indeed, the need to decide whether the CJRA actually did sunset in
December 1997 affords an excellent opportunity for addressing the
issues.
The 105th Congress must continue evaluating the Judicial Conference reports and recommendations regarding the pilot and demonstration
programs which the Conference premised substantially on the RAND
and FJC studies. Congress should seriously consider how to resolve
the CJRA's fate because the Conference tendered its reports in May
1997 and Congress has had considerable time to study it. 137 Congress
could consult the RAND and FJC findings, which indicate that experimentation with the CJRA-prescribed procedures offered no discemable

136. Judges, when interpreting and applying the PSLRA, must attempt to hannonizc the intent
of the 104th Congress in passing the statute and of prior Congresses in enacting C<lllicr securities laws. For example, courts should be sensitive to, and prevent, the abusive litigation practices which the PSLRA was intended to treat Judges must also nnticlpate nnd stop the above
problems which frustrate potential pl\}intiffs' pursuit of securities fraud claims. Such difficulties
can erode vigorous private enforcement of the securities statutes.
137. See Judicial Cont: Report, supra note 122; see also 28 U.S.C. § 471 notes (1994).
Congress could independently evaluate the RAND nnd FJC analyses, collect its ov.n data from
the pilot, demonstration or other courts or work with the FJC or the AO which have carefully
monitored implementation since 1990. However, such legislative efforts might prove duplicative
and wasteful because Congress may lack sufficient resources nnd expertise nnd it has not closely monitored CJRA effectuation. Congress did pass legislation which extends the reporting
requirements relating to case dispositions in section 476 of the CJRA. but it is unclear what
effect the 1997 measure has on the 1990 CJRA's expiration. See Pub. L No. 10S-S3, § 2,
lll Stat 1173 (1997).
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benefit in terms of important parameters, namely cost or delay reduction, litigant satisfaction, and fairness, but that judges who employ
sound judicial case management practices can save time and perhaps
expense. 138
These determinations of RAND and the FJC suggest that Congress
should allow the CJRA to sunset and fully implement the JIA's purposes of limiting local procedural proliferation and conflicting requirements
while restoring the primacy of national rule revision. Congress can
best facilitate the thorough effectuation of the JIA's goals of restricting
proliferation and inconsiste~cy by appropriating sufficient resources for
"those entities which must review local procedures to discharge their
duties effectively. 139
If CJRA experimentation yielded any procedures that are very efficacious in reducing cost or delay and warrant national application, those
measures could be included in the Federal Rules through the normal
amendment process. 140 Mechanisms that limited cost or delay, but
which were insufficiently effective to deserve nationwide implementation or as to which unce~inty remains, may be designated for future
experimentation. 141 Experimentation might also proceed pursuant to a
1991 proposed change in Federal Rule 83 that the national revision
entities withdrew. 142 This proposal could capitalize on experience and
could encourage local creativity in designing promising experimental
procedures. It would also maintain a measure of control in a centralized, expert entity which might coordinate the districts' work by, for
instance, limiting the number of inconsistent local procedures and promoting experimentation witµ optimally diverse measures. The approach
could prove peculiarly efficacious in facilitating experimentation with
case management techniques, which were apparently the most successful

138. See KAKALIK ET AL., supra note 125, at l; STIENSTRA ET AL., supra note 125; see also
Edward D. Cavanagh, Congress' Failed Attempt to Spur Court Efficiency: The Legacy of the
Civil Justice Reform Act, LEGAL TIMES, Nov. 25, 1996.
139. See Tobias, Sixth, supra note 61; see also supra p. 560 (suggesting that Congress revitalize national revision process by eschewing legislative revision of Federal Rules which PSLRA
and AAA exemplify because this bypasses and erodes process). The courts of appeals, the
Judicial Conference and Judges, acting alone and through their districts, should attempt to limit
proliferating local procedures.
140. In this sentence and the next, I rely on supra notes 122 and 126.
141. Judges individually, or through the Conference, should (1) identify which procedures,
especially case management measures, deserve which treatment; (2) preserve applicable CJRA
data; and (3) compile annual assessments that evaluate all relevant effects of CJRA experimentation.
142. See supra note 131 and accompanying text
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CJRA procedures, 143 because judges frequently develop the mechanisms
to treat varying local conditions, so that the measures can differ substantially across districts. 144
CONCLUSION

The 104th Congress considered the AAA and several products liability proposals; however, the only legal reform which in fact became
law was the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act. The PSLRA has
had, and the recently-reintroduced AAA and products liability bill could
have, a number of detrimental impacts on continuing reform efforts,
specific lawsuits, and the civil justice process. Congress should rescind
the PSLRA's provisions that have had these effects, or at the least, suspend implementation of the statute's strictures which interfere with
ongoing initiatives. In the meantime, it should reject the AAA and the
products liability measure or delay adoption of their requirements that
could conflict with continuing reforms.

143. See supra note 138 and accompanying texl
144. See Robel, supra note 48, at 1484; see also supra notes 129-30 nnd nccomp:inying text
(suggesting that Congress might authorize e.xperimentntion with the AAA's provisions, as \\ith
court-annexed arbitration, but should proceed cautiously because this could erode national rule
revision which can better consider the prescriptions). The AAA's thorough evaluation above
means that it warrants little elaboration here. Most importnnt, all three or its provisions can be
considered best in the normal rule revision process, which legislative amendment would bypass
and erode. The products liability reform measure presents n closer question principally because
the alternatives available appear less -satisfactory. See supra note 121.

